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Wireless sensor-actuator networks (WSANs) are gaining momentum in industrial process automation as a communication infras-
tructure for lowering deployment and maintenance costs. In traditional wireless control systems the plant controller and the network
manager operate in isolation, which ignore the signicant inuence of network reliability on plant control performance. To enhance
the dependability of industrial wireless control, we propose a holistic cyber-physical management framework that employs run-time
coordination between the plant control and network management. Our design includes a holistic controller that generates actuation
signals to physical plants and recongures the WSAN to maintain desired control performance while saving wireless resources. As
a concrete example of holistic control, we design a holistic manager that dynamically recongures the number of transmissions in
the WSAN based on online observations of physical and cyber variables. We have implemented the holistic management framework
in the Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator (WCPS). A systematic case study has been presented based on two 5-state plants sharing a
16-node WSAN. Simulation results show that the holistic management design has signicantly enhanced the resilience of the system
against both wireless interferences and physical disturbances, while eectively reducing the number of wireless transmissions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of industrial wireless standards such as WirelessHART [15] and ISA100 [37], wireless sensor-
actuator networks (WSANs) are being deployed in process industries world wide. However, existing WSAN in process
industries are usually used for monitoring applications. ere remain signicant challenges in supporting feedback
control systems over WSAN due to concerns about dependability of wireless control systems (WCS). A wireless control
system (WCS) employs a WSAN as the communication infrastructure for one or more feedback control loops, where
the sensors, controllers and actuators communicate over the WSAN. Despite considerable eorts to enhance the relia-
bility of industrial WSAN, data loss is inevitable in open and hash operating environments, which may lead to severe
degradation of control performance, or even system instabilities. A dependable WCS therefore must maintain system
stability and acceptable control performance under both physical disturbance and wireless interference. A WCS is
particularly vulnerable when signicant data loss coincides with the plant experiencing a poor physical state. e
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Fig. 1. Traditional design (le) vs. holistic co-design (right) of wireless process control systems.
challenge to utilize the WSAN for feedback control prevents the process industries from exploiting the full potential
of wireless technologies, forcing plants to maintain extensive wired infrastructure despite the existence of the WSAN.
erefore, it is critical to develop WCS that are dependable under challenging cyber and physical conditions.
Although the control system performance is heavily inuenced byWSAN reliability, traditionally the physical plant
and the network are controlled separately at run time. e physical plant is controlled by a controller designed based
on certain assumptions about the communication network. However, the unpredictable wireless conditions of aWSAN
mean that the wireless network design goals cannot be guaranteed, leading to unsafe physical plant operations. On the
other hand, the network is managed to reduce data loss in a best eort fashion, without any knowledge of the current
requirements of the control system. Notably, the required level of network reliability depends on the physical states of
the plant. When the physical plant is in an unsafe state, it requires highly reliable communication. Conversely, when
the physical plant is in a safe steady state, it is more tolerant to data loss which may in turn allow the network to save
network resource.
Building on this insight, we propose a holistic cyber-physical management framework where the wireless network
and the physical controller operate in a closed-loop fashion. In this holistic management approach, the controller is
endowed with the capability of modifying network congurations in addition to the physical plant itself, as shown
in Fig. 1. e controller that provides control commands to both the physical plant and the WSAN is regarded as
the holistic controller. By coordinating the control and network management at run time, the holistic management
approach can enhance the dependability of the WCS under both physical disturbance and wireless interference. It can
also improve the network eciency when the plant state allows data loss.
e contributions of this work are four-fold:
(1) We propose the holistic management framework to enhance the dependability of WCS through coordinated
control and network management;
(2) We design a holistic controller based on a model predictive control scheme that simultaneously controls the
physical plant while adjusting network congurations based on the state of the physical plant;
(3) We present an example holistic management design that employs a network adaptation algorithm that dynam-
ically adjust the number of retransmissions used to send certain actuation commands based on the physical
plant conditions.
(4) We demonstrate through simulations that our holistic management scheme can enhance system dependability
under both sensor disturbance and wireless interference, while avoiding allocating unnecessary retransmis-
sions when not needed for the purpose of control.
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e rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our results in the context of related work. Sec-
tion 3 presents the system architecture of our wireless networked control system. Section 4 presents the design of our
holistic controller and its adaptation algorithm. Section 5 presents an implementable solution for a run-time WSAN
reconguration. Section 6 presents our experimental results.
2 RELATED WORK
Networked control systems are some of the best examples in the area of cyber-physical systems, and therefore have
been extensively studied in the past decade. As such, extensions of the traditional Kalman lter have been proposed
for state estimation based on intermient observations [16, 33, 38], enabling the use of lossy networks and delayed
information in feedback control applications. New sampling methods, such as event-based and self-triggered control,
have been developed to reduce communication trac over wireless networks [2, 34]. ese results have addressed
important problems related to cyber-physical co-design, and have validated the intuition that more network resources
are needed when the physical states are away from a stable equilibrium point, while few network resources are needed
when the physical states are close to a stable steady-state. However, scheduling the number of packets that a network
must transmit to control a system is only one side of the problem, since networks in general, and wireless networks in
particular, can choose among many congurations (e.g., number of retransmissions, scheduling and routing) to deliver
those packets [14, 23, 27, 28, 30]. In other words, instead of abstracting the network as a transparent mechanism
to transfer control information when needed, networked controllers should bidirectionally interact with the network
manager as the dynamics of the physical system evolve. at is, the control system and the network should bemanaged
in a dynamic and holistic manner.
Dynamic stability results exist under several network congurations and communication conditions, including
studies of delayed packet delivery and non-independent packet losses [7, 22, 26, 29]. However, stability guarantees
for networked control systems typically come in the form of minimal requirements that a network must guarantee,
such as bounds in data loss or in latency, thus disregarding cooperative approaches to adapt network conditions to
physical plant performance and vice versa. Even network protocols designed with control systems in mind, such as
WirelessHART [15], can only guarantee a specic level of reliability and performance under certain assumptions, thus
potentially violating the sucient conditions established in those theoretical results, especially when there are cyber
or physical disturbances, or even malicious aacks. Indeed, in the case of industrial wireless environments, these dis-
turbances take the form of cross-protocol interference, physical obstacles, power failures, extreme weather, or sensor
failures, among many others.
e impact of retransmissions on control performance was studied in wireless control design. Previous works [9, 11]
showed that maximizing packet delivery ratio with deadline constraints oers theoretically good control conditions
and explored the tradeo between reliability and latency in control design. While those works focused on control
design, our holistic management framework can dynamically change network congurations based on the states of
the physical systems at run time.
From a networking perspective, several groups have worked on tailoring wireless network protocols for control
systems applications. For example, a cooperative MAC method was proposed to maintain control performance under
unbounded delay, burst of packet loss, and ambient wireless trac [36]. Bernardini and Bemporad have proposed
a communication strategy between sensors and the controller that minimizes the data exchange over the wireless
channel [4]. Also, several groups have considered specic scheduling and control schemes for closed-loop systems
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Fig. 2. System Architecture.
with stability guarantees [3, 10, 12, 17, 21, 31]. Our eort is complementary to those works in that we aim to develop
a holistic cyber-physical management framework for wireless control systems instead of developing new network
protocols.
In our previous studies [19, 20], we have experimentally investigated the eect of harsh network conditions on
control loops. We have also developed specic routing and scheduling protocols to mitigate their eect. In this paper
we build upon our previous results, developing a holistic management scheme that instead of asking the network for
a xed minimum set of performance conditions, updates both control algorithm and network congurations, result-
ing in a robust and safe physical execution and an ecient network information ow. As shown in Section. 6, our
holistic management scheme increases the resilience of the closed-loop system, even in the presence of high wireless
background noise and sensor malfunctions.
3 A WIRELESS CONTROL SYSTEM
Since the working conditions of industrial plants are always too harsh for the controllers to operate, and since one
industrial PC is supposed to control multiple loops, controllers are always located far away from the plants in wire-
less industrial process control deployments. erefore, standard industrial wireless control systems use multi-hop
networks, such as ISA [37], WirelessHART [15], and ZigBee [40] to deliver information from a collection of sensors to
a remote controller, and then back from the controller to the actuators in the plant. In this paper, we adopt this gen-
eral architecture, which we upgrade by using two modules to mitigate the impact of information loss in the wireless
network: a state observer and an actuation signal buer. Below, we explain in detail how each of the components in
our architecture interact to close the control feedback loop.
3.1 Physical Plant and Controller
Fig. 2 shows the closed-loop system architecture that we consider in this paper, which closely follows to the architecture
we considered in [19]. We assume that the plant is a linear time-invariant system, governed by the following dierence
equation:
xt+1 = Axt + B ut , yt = C xt , t ∈ N, (1)
where t is the time index, xt ∈ R
n is the state vector, ut ∈ R
m is input vector, yt ∈ R
p is the output vector, A ∈ Rn×n ,
B ∈ Rn×m , and C ∈ Rp×n . We assume that the pair (A,B) is controllable and that the pair (A,C) is observable.
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Sensor measurements yt are transmied to a remote controller via the wireless network. At time t , the wireless
network delivers a vector yˆt , which is either equal to yt−1 or is a no-data signal if the packet is unable to be delivered
within the time sampling deadline. e vector yˆt is delivered to an intermient observation Kalman lter [33], which
produces an estimated state vector xˆt regardless of whether the wireless network was capable of delivering the sensing
information.
At the core of the remote controller is a model predictive control scheme that at each time t solves the following
optimal control problem:
V (xˆt )= min
{uj }
t+N−1
j=t
t+N−1∑
j=t
(
xTj Q xj + u
T
j Ruj
)
+ xTt+N S xt+N ,
subject to: xt = xˆt ,
xj+1 = Axj + B uj ,
xj ∈ X, uj ∈ U, j ∈ {t , . . . , t + N −1},
xt+N ∈ Xf ,
(2)
where N ≥ 0 is the time horizon, Q, S ∈ Rn×n are positive semi-denite, R ∈ Rm×m is positive denite, U ⊂ Rm
is the input constraint set, and X,Xf ⊂ R
n are the state safety and nal constraint sets, respectively. We denote by
{u∗t, j }
t+N−1
j=t the optimal input signal at time t , which is the minimizer associated with value V (xˆt ) in (2). Note that
the controller in (2) can also be used to control the system in (1) around any state reference x¯ ∈ X, satisfying:
(A − I ) x¯ + B u¯ = 0, for some u¯ ∈ U. (3)
We assume that x¯ ∈ X and u¯ ∈ U.
e MPC scheme in (2) sends the resulting sequence of optimal inputs, {u∗t, j }
t+N−1
j=t , over the wireless network.
Whenever the sequence successfully traverses the wireless network, it overwrites the old sequence stored in a buer
that periodically feeds the plant actuators. Hence, if the packet containing the input sequence is successfully delivered
at time t , then the actuator will apply the vector u∗t,t . If, instead, the packet is dropped, then the actuator will apply
the vector u∗t−1,t , and a similar procedure is repeated if consecutive actuation packets are dropped. us, the buer
allows us to feed the actuator with an optimal (albeit potentially obsolete) input, even if N packets are consecutively
dropped, as explained in [19].
It is worth noting that while the state observer provides a robust and theoretically sound protection against loss of
sensing information, the buers delivering samples to the actuators are implemented following a heuristic approach.
Indeed, one would expect that if the MPC scheme is properly tuned and there are no external disturbances, then any
two consecutive actuation signals, say u∗t,t+1 and u
∗
t+1,t+1, will not be very dierent. e limit case occurs when the
plant reaches steady-state and no external disturbances are applied to the plant, where the MPC scheme computes N
identical samples every time, i.e. u∗t, j = u¯ for each j. us, in that case, our buer heuristics allows us to withstand
the loss of N consecutive actuation packets without a control performance loss. is situation is exemplied in both
simulations in Section. 6.
3.2 Wireless Network and Manager
We adopt a WirelessHART [15] architecture for our WSAN design, which is designed for applications in industrial
wireless process automation by selecting a set of specic network features that enable timely and highly reliable
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communication. A WirelessHART network is a wireless multi-hop mesh network consisting of a number of baery-
powered eld devices connected to a gateway through access points. e network is managed by a centralized network
manager, usually collocated with the gateway. e network manager collects topology information from the eld
devices, computes routes and transmission schedules, and disseminates the routing information and schedules among
eld devices.
WirelessHART adopts the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer designed for low cost and low data rate communication.
Transmissions are scheduled based on a multi-channel Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol which can
provide a deterministic and collision-free communication compared to CSMA/CA, and which works perfectly with
periodic communication. Each time slot is 10ms, which can accommodate a transmission and its acknowledgement.
For transmissions between pairs of nodes, a time slot can either be dedicated or shared. In a dedicated slot, only one
sender is allowed to transmit. In a shared slot, more than one sender competes for one transmission opportunity. Wire-
lessHART networks operate on a 2.4GHz ISM band, and can use up to 16 channels, as dened in IEEE 802.15.4 physical
layer standard. Also, WirelessHART networks adopt channel hopping for channel diversity, periodically changing the
communication channel according to a predetermined schedule. At the network layer, the WirelessHART protocol
supports two types of routings, namely, source and graph routing. Source routing provides a single path from source
to destination, while graph routing consists of multiple routes for each pair of source and destination.
As explained in Section. 1, the performance of the wireless network and the closed-loop control system are inter-
twined. Among all the statistics one can measure regarding the performance of a wireless network, the packet delivery
ratio (PDR) is at rst sight the most signicant for control applications, since a perfect PDR implies that all the infor-
mation sent through the network is eventually delivered. On the other hand, high PDR in multi-hop networks come
associated with long delays due to redundant transmission and route diversity, which can be longer than the informa-
tion ow deadlines. erefore, in this paper, we propose a novel holistic controller, capable of balancing physical and
wireless requirements while maintaining the stability of the plant. e holistic controller will simultaneously compute
actuation signals and command the network to update its conguration, as a function of current PDR measurements
and worst-case state performance predictions.
Network reliability can be achieved through dierent means such as packet retransmission, route diversity, or chan-
nel diversity, among others. Our design adopts a mechanism in which the number of transmissions of a certain route
changes according to the conditions of a network and a physical plant. In this paper, we avoid modifying more than
one network conguration parameter to simplify our presentation and avoid an unnecessarily complex algorithm.
e transmission number (#TX ) is at the center of a tradeo between reliability and network resources, i.e. more
transmissions lead to a higher delivery ratio at a cost of network resources. Fig. 3 depicts the relationship between end-
to-end delivery ratio and the retransmission number (#ReTX ) under a 16-node WSAN. ere is a diminishing return
of PDR improvement as the #ReTX increases. (e seings of this set of experiments are the same with Section. 6)
On the other hand, higher packet delivery ratios do not immediately imply a good closed-loop performance in
the physical plant, as shown in Fig. 4. (e seings of this set of experiments are the same with Section. 6) Indeed,
internal properties of the physical plant, such as its stability, limit and shape the eect that improvements in network
communication have on the nal control objective. is is ourmotivation to create a new holistic controller that collects
and intertwines information from both physical system and wireless network, adapting all the available parameters
towards the goal of stable and safe physical executions.
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Fig. 3. Average PDR measured for dierent retransmission indices under dierent wireless background noise conditions.
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Fig. 4. Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for dierent retransmission indices under dierent wireless background noise conditions, eval-
uated on two linear systems: one open-loop unstable (a), the other open-loop stable (b). Note how higher PDRs have dierent
consequences depending on the properties of the physical plant.
In this paper, we do not aim only to nd theoretical sucient conditions to guarantee the stability of the physical
plant, but we also aim to provide an implementable algorithm for the holistic controller and network manager.
4 HOLISTIC CONTROLLER DESIGN
In this section, we focus on three key areas to achieve our objective of designing a stable controller over a Wire-
lessHART multi-hop network. First, we show that in an ideal case, where the network delivers every packet with no
delay, the MPC scheme in (2) results in asymptotically stable executions. We achieve this goal by showing that the
function V (x), dened in (2), is in fact a Lyapunov function. Second, we nd theoretical bounds for the worst-case
evolution of the Lyapunov function V (x). us, if the wireless control architecture described in Section. 3 results in
values of the Lyapunov function that violate the worst-case bounds, then wemust adjust the parameters in the wireless
network to increase reliability. ird, we use this adaptation principle to build a holistic algorithm that guarantees the
stability of the physical plant while simultaneously reducing the latency and power usage of the wireless network.
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Without loss of generality, we assume throughout this section that x¯ = 0 and u¯ = 0, as dened in (3), to simplify
our notation.
4.1 Stable Control of the Physical Plant
Our holistic controller uses a combination of theoretical guarantees and real-time observations to decide how many
transmissions must schedule each node in the wireless network. At the core of our algorithm is the guarantee that,
using an ideal network, the MPC scheme dened in Section. 3 results in (exponentially) asymptotically stable trajecto-
ries.
We follow the strategies described in [32] and [24, Sec. 3.3] to prove the stability of our MPC scheme. In particular,
using the notation in (2), given the matrices Q and R, we compute P as the unique positive denite solution of the
following discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation:
P = AT P A +Q −AT P B
(
R + BT P B
)−1
BT P A, (4)
and we dene:
K = −
(
R + BT P B
)−1
BT P A. (5)
Lemma 4.1. Assume that X andU are polytopes, i.e., X = {x | Γx x ≤ bx } andU = {u | Γu u ≤ bu }, and consider the
MPC scheme in (2).
If P is dened as in (4), K is dened as in (5), S = β P for β ≥ 1, and:
Xf =
{
x |
[
Γx
Γu K
]
x ≤
[
bx
bu
]}
, (6)
then the system in (1) is asymptotically stable and V (x) is a Lyapunov function.
Proof. It is sucient to show that we satisfy the conditions in Assumptions A1 to A4 in [24, Sec. 3.3], where
κf (x) = K x . Indeed, Assumptions A1 and A2 are trivially satised thanks to our denition in (6). Assumption A3
follows Lemma 1 in [32], and Assumption A4 is satised since a simple algebraic manipulation of (4) implies that:
(A + B K)T S (A + B K) − S +Q + KT R K = (1 − β)
(
Q + KT R K
)
, (7)
where the right-hand side is a negative semi-denite matrix, as desired. 
Note that β allows us to easily adjust the transient response while maintaining the stability guarantee. Also note
that in pathological situations, the set Xf in (6) could be empty or have no interior. A discussion regarding those
situations is beyond the scope of this paper; we refer the interested reader to [6, Ch. 5.2.3].
Our holistic controller uses the value of the Lyapunov functionV (xˆt ) to test if the wireless network has an undesired
impact over the performance of the physical plant. Our test requires calculating three parameters, {αi }
3
i=1, as explained
below.
Lemma 4.2. ConsiderV (x) as dened in (2). Let P0 be positive denite matrix computed recursively via the time-varying
discrete-time Riccati equation:
Pk−1= A
T Pk A +Q −A
T Pk B
(
R + BT Pk B
)−1
BT Pk A, (8)
with PN = S , and with α1 as the smallest eigenvalue of P0. enV (x) ≥ α1 ‖x ‖
2.
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Proof. If we relax the optimization problem by seingU = Rm andX = Xf = R
n , then we obtain a nite-horizon
LQR problem. As explained in [5, Ch. 4.1], the value of a nite-horizon LQR problem with initial condition x is xT P0 x ;
hence V (x) ≥ xT P0 x ≥ α1 ‖x ‖
2. 
Note that if we choose β = 1, then P0 = P , as dened in (4); thus we simplify the numerical calculation of α1.
Lemma 4.3. ConsiderV (x), A,Q , and S as dened in (2). Let:
M =
N−1∑
j=0
(
Aj Q Aj
)
+AN S AN , (9)
and let α2 be the largest eigenvalue of M . enV (x) ≤ α2 ‖x ‖
2.
Proof. e proof follows directly aer noting thatuj = 0 for each j is a feasible input signal. usV (x) ≤ x
T M x ≤
α2 ‖x ‖
2. 
Lemma 4.4. Consider the system in (1) with the closed-loop controller in (2). Let α3 be the smallest eigenvalue of Q .
enV (xt+1) −V (xt ) ≤ −α3 ‖xt ‖
2.
Proof. Let
{
u∗t, j
}t+N−1
j=t
be the optimal input signal associated with the value function V (xt ). Let
{
xj
}t+N
j=t
be
execution resulting from applying the input
{
u∗t, j
}t+N−1
j=t
.
Note that the input signal
{
u∗t,t+1,u
∗
t,t+2, . . . ,u
∗
t,t+N−1
,K xt+N
}
belongs to the feasible set of the problem with
value V (xt+1). Hence:
V (xt+1) ≤
t+N−1∑
j=t+1
(
xTj Q xj +
(
u∗t, j
)T
Ru∗t, j
)
+ xTt+N
(
Q + KT R K + (A + B K)T S (A + B K)
)
xt+N , (10)
and:
V (xt+1) −V (xt ) ≤ −xt Q xt ≤ −α3 ‖xt ‖
2
, (11)
where we use the result in (7) aer eliminating all the repeated terms in (10) and V (xt ). 
Using the parameters {αi }
3
i=1, we now obtain two results that will become the test conditions to evaluate the per-
formance loss of the physical control loop due to information loss in the wireless network.
Lemma 4.5. Consider the system in (1) with the closed-loop controller in (2). If V (x) ≤ α1 γ , then ‖x ‖
2 ≤ γ .
Proof. Suppose that ‖x ‖2 > γ , then V (x) ≥ α1 ‖x ‖
2
> α1 γ . e result follows, using the contrapositive of the
argument above. 
Lemma 4.6. Consider the system in (1) with the closed-loop controller in (2). en, for each j ∈ N:
V (xt+j ) ≤
(
1 −
α3
α2
) j
V (xt ). (12)
Proof. Using the results in Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 we get that, for each t ∈ N, V (xt+1) ≤
(
1 − α3α2
)
V (xt ). e desired
result follows by induction. 
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4.2 #TX Adaptation
As explained in Section. 3, among all the conguration parameters of the wireless network that we can modify, we
have chosen to adapt the #TX , denoted ηt , that each node in the network uses to determine the maximum number of
retries used to send a packet before it is dropped. While one can intuitively expect that more transmissions should
improve the physical control loop performance, they come associated with longer delays and shorter baery lifetimes
for the nodes. Moreover, it is not immediately clear how to quantify the impact that more transmissions have in the
control loop, as shown in Fig. 4.
e value of the Lyapunov functionV (xˆt ) at each t for each control loop, and the bounds in the lemmas above, give
us a constructive testing mechanism to evaluate the impact that the loss of information in the wireless network has
on the physical plant. Suppose that a setpoint x¯ has been computed as in (3), and a desired maximum deviation from
that setpoint, γ , has been dened, i.e. the goal is to maintain ‖xt − x¯ ‖
2 ≤ γ for each t ∈ N. To build a #TX adaptation
algorithm based on the analytical results above, we must rst establish a set of principles that our algorithm must
satisfy:
• If V (xt ) ≤ α1 γ , then ηt+1 ≤ ηt , i.e. ηt will not increase, since the physical plant is within acceptable bounds,
as shown in Lemma 4.5.
• Given λ ∈ (0, 1), if V (xt ) ≥ λ α1 γ , then ηt+1 ≥ ηt , i.e. ηt will not decrease, since the physical plant might get
closer to the safety bound in Lemma 4.5.
• If V (xt+j ) ≤
(
1 − α3α2
) j
V (xt ), then ηt+j ≤ ηt , i.e. ηt will not increase, since the physical is evolving towards
its equilibrium point within expected bounds, as shown in Lemma 4.6.
• If the current PDR, denoted ρt , is below a threshold, say ρt < ρmin, then ηt+1 ≥ ηt , i.e. ηt will not decrease,
since the network must maintain a minimum connectivity level.
e parameter λ is used to create a dead-band between increases and decreases of the #TX . Indeed, if V (xt ) ∈
[λ α1 γ ,α1 γ ] then ηt remains constant.
Our #TX adaptation algorithm for each control loop is described in detail in Alg. 1. Given a control loop, we measure
the current packet delivery ratio ρt on each iteration, and we computeV (xˆt ). With these two values, we decidewhether
we decrease, increase, or maintain the #TX . e variable δ is used as an internal state to determine whether the last
#TX change was an increase (δ = 1) or a decrease (δ = 0). e parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) determines the width of the
dead-band for the Lyapunov function where the #TX is le unchanged. e parameter τ1 ∈ N is the minimum number
of iterations it takes the wireless network to propagate the new transmission schedule, as explained in Section. 5. e
parameter τ2 ∈ N is used to slow down the #TX decreases, since those might eventually result in violations of the
safety bound in Lemma 4.5. Finally, the parameters ηmax and ρmin are chosen such that all routes can be scheduled
and minimum network control information is still delivered.
Our control strategy cannot mathematically guarantee the closed-loop system stability of the WSAN unless extra
assumptions are considered, which is a common approach in the literature [1, 13, 22]. e applicability and appropriate-
ness of these assumptions depend on the particular properties of the industrial plant at hand, thus we avoid imposing a
particular framework in this paper. Instead, our algorithm takes a best-eort approach towards balancing closed-loop
performance and network load, which is a practical heuristic in real-world scenarios. e stability of our algorithm
hinges on the relation between dropped actuation packets and their impact on the empirical Lyapunov function at
each iteration, which has been studied in the past [2, 25].
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ALGORITHM 1: #TX adaptation algorithm for each control loop.
Input: t, τ1, τ2 ∈ N, t0 = t , λ ∈ (0, 1), ρmin ∈ [0, 1], ηmax ∈ N, δ = −1, and an initial #TX ηt ∈ {1, . . . , ηmax }.
Output: #TX ηt
Loop
Evaluate V (xˆt ) as dened in (2);
Measure the PDR ρt ;
if V (xˆt ) < λ α1 γ and ηt > 0 and ρt ≥ ρmin then
if δ , 0 then
t0 ← t ;
δ ← 0;
end
if t − t0 > τ2 then
t0 ← t ;
ηt+j ← ηt − 1 for each j ≤ τ1;
t ← t + τ1 ;
end
else if V (xˆt ) > α1 γ and ηt < ηmax then
if δ , 1 then
t0 ← t ;
end
if δ , 1 or V (xˆt ) >
(
1 −
α3
α2
)t−t0 V (xˆt0 ) then
δ ← 1;
ηt+j ← ηt + 1 for each j ≤ τ1;
t ← t + τ1 ;
end
else
ηt+1 ← ηt ;
t ← t + 1;
end
EndLoop
5 NETWORK RECONFIGURATION
In this section, we introduce a run-time reconguration protocol for the WSAN. Our previous research has demon-
strated that a wireless control system can have dierent levels of resilience to packet loss for sensing and actuation.
Motivated by the asymmetric routing idea in [19], We develop an asymmetric scheduling approach in which the num-
ber of packet transmissions of the sensing and actuation phase can be congured independently. Considering that
sensing data are less vulnerable against packet loss because of the state observer, we do not allocate retransmissions
for sensing packets. However, we allow a holistic controller to adaptively adjust the number of transmissions for ac-
tuation packets of each control loop based on the physical and network conditions. is need for adjustment stems
from the fact that the control performance is more sensitive to packet loss from the controller to the actuators despite
the buered control inputs.
We next present a run-time transmission adaptation protocol. In our design, the network manager generates a
schedule that allocates enough slots to accommodate the maximum #TX over each link dened by the TX adaptation
algorithm: if a transmission is scheduled at time slot x , then the scheduler will reserve the next n − 1 consecutive
slots for its retransmissions, where n is the maximum #TX per hop. Each schedule entry is represented by a tuple
[slot oset, channel, sender, receiver, owID, #TX(owID)]. A transmission schedule is called a superframe, which
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Table 1. Piggyback Algorithm Superframe Examples
#TX Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6 Slot 7 Slot 8 Slot 9 Slot 10 Slot 11 Slot12
1 A→B B→C A→B B→D
2 A→B A→B B→C B→C A→B A→B B→D B→D
3 A→B A→B A→B B→C B→C B→C A→B A→B A→B B→D B→D B→D
repeats itself during runtime. e slot oset is the relative time slot number in a superframe. e owID species
the ow a transmission belongs to, and #TX(owID) indicates the current #TX of this ow, enabling the protocol to
congure #TX of each ow independently. In Table 1, 1TX to 3TX presents a TDMA-schedule for 2 ows F1 and F2
that deliver data through nodes A→ B→ C and A→ B→ D, respectively, when #TX(F1) and #TX(F2) vary from 1 to
3 transmissions. e superframe has a length of 12 time slots. Note that other routing and scheduling algorithms exist
that optimize network resource usage to enhance network scalability, but these are not within the scope of this work.
We adopt a piggyback mechanism to disseminate a newly computed #TX for a certain control loop (ow) gener-
ated by the holistic controller. A network manager, which is co-located with a holistic controller, can incorporate the
updated #TX and the #Flow into all the periodic actuation packets in this control loop. Hence, all nodes along the actu-
ation routes of certain control loops can receive this update. is piggyback mechanism helps reduce communication
cost by utilizing existing periodic communication. Once a node receives a #TX switch command, it will apply a new
#TX at the beginning of next superframe. However, if a node fails to receive the command due to packet loss, it will
continue to use the current #TX until any actuation packet is received. erefore, it is possible that, at the same time,
dierent nodes along the route of a ow may use dierent #TX .
Nevertheless, it is still possible for nodes to eventually receive the update since they are always scheduled to commu-
nicate at the slot allocated for their rst transmission aempts over a link. For example, in Table 1, the transmissions
colored red represent the current schedule for ow F1 (A → B → C) and F2 (A → B→ D), when a controller issues a
command to update #TX(F1) from 1 to 2, and #TX(F2) = 3. In this example, the update reaches node A and B at time
slot 1, but fails to arrive at C at time slot 4 due to packet loss. Hence, A and B will switch to 2TX, while C remains to
use 1TX. Although B and C use dierent #TX , it is still possible for C to receive actuation and mode switch commands
from B in the following superframe since B and C will always communicate at slot 4 regardless of #TX . e #TX of F2
is kept unaltered during the process since there is no #TX update for F2.
It is worth noting that our paper mainly discusses WSANs that are revivable under moderate cyber and physical
aacks. is is why we set ρmin to guarantee relatively high PDRs of wireless networks in Section. 4.2. Under extreme
conditions, a larger portion of piggyback packets may be lost. In this case, sending commands to switch modes by
broadcasting or ooding might be a beer solution.
6 CASE STUDY
In this section, we introduce a systematic case study for our holisticWSAN controller. On the physical side, we use two
5-state linear time-invariant plants that share the same WSAN as representative of an industrial process systems. One
of the plants is open-loop unstable, and the other is open-loop stable. On the cyber side, we simulate a 16-node WSAN
using the WCPS simulator [8], seeded with real-world wireless traces as explained in [19–21]. WCPS works by fully
integrating Simulink [35] and TOSSIM [18]. Besides studying the behavior of the algorithms presented in Sections. 4
and 5, we also test the performance of our system under both cyber and physical disturbances. We will present the
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case study of the open-loop unstable plant in the rst three sections. en, we will include an open-loop stable plant
that shares WSAN with that open-loop unstable plant to form a multi-loop simulation in Section. 6.4.
6.1 Experimental Seing
e plant is dened in (1), with the following parameters:
A =

0.717 −1.367 −0.218 −0.867 −0.899
0.078 0.209 −0.105 −0.511 −0.466
0.122 0.891 1.305 0.511 0.666
−0.243 −1.383 −0.610 −0.023 −0.932
0.122 0.871 0.165 0.712 1.466

, B =

0.083
0.056
−0.056
0.111
−0.056

, and C =

0
1
1
0
0

T
. (13)
Note that the set of eigenvalues of A is equal to {0.413, 0.563, 0.624, 1.068, 1.006}. Since there are two eigenvalues
outside the unit circle, the plant is open-loop unstable.
e parameters of the MPC scheme in (2) are chosen as follows:
Q =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 5 0
0 0 0 0 1

, S =

439 518.37 942.57 220.13 588.16
518.37 633.85 1124.8 266.03 708.54
942.57 1124.8 2045.3 483.1 1274.2
220.13 266.03 483.1 129.01 309.01
588.16 708.54 1274.2 309.01 809.37

, x¯ =

0.289
1.735
0.578
−1.157
−1.735

,
K =
[
−20.49 −20.48 −42.66 −11.24 −26.38
]
.
(14)
Also, u¯ = 0.2, R = 0.08, N = 50, X = R5, and U = {|u | ≤ 40}, where S , K , and Xf are computed as described in
Lemma 4.1 with β = 1.1.
e parameters of the Alg. 1 are λ = 0.1, τ1 = 5, τ2 = 500, γ = 16, α1 = 1.977, α2 = 8.223 · 10
6, and α3 = 1, where
{αi }
3
i=1 are computed as described in Lemmas 4.2 to 4.4.
We use WCPS [8], which was developed by the Cyber-Physical Systems Laboratory at Washington University, as
a platform for holistic wireless control system simulations. WCPS employs a federated architecture that integrates
Simulink [35] for simulating the physical system dynamics and controllers, and TOSSIM [18] for simulating WSANs.
Both Simulink and TOSSIM are among the leading simulators in the control and networking communities, respectively,
but with lile interaction between them in the past. Furthermore, the WirelessHART network protocol stack is imple-
mented as part of WCPS 2.0 [20], including protocols at the routing (Source and Graph Routing) and MAC layers. To
the best of our knowledge, WCPS is the rst simulator that supports all these WirelessHART features with a realistic
wireless link model.
In this paper, we have incorporated the new #TX reconguration mechanism presented in Section. 5 into WCPS.
Additionally, we have included multi-rate functionality into the simulation. In reality, the industrial plant models are
mostly continuous or running at very high frequencies. However, thewireless communication and controller execute at
a relatively low frequency because of the network latency and computational latency. erefore, we incorporate multi-
rate functionality in WCPS, which simulates plant, wireless network, and controller in multiple rates. Additionally,
we have considered the latency of each module in the wireless control loop. Since sensing measurements and control
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Fig. 5. Time-driven scheduling of wireless control system
commands are sent via WSAN periodically, time-driven scheduling is adopted, as is shown in Fig. 5. We determine the
length of each event based on its worst-case execution time.
We simulate a wireless network consisting of 16 nodes, where each simulation is based upon data traces collected
from ourWSAN testbed atWashington University. e collected information includes received signal strength indicator
(RSSI) and electromagnetic noise, which are used as inputs for the wireless link model in WCPS. e WSAN in this
study consists of 6 sensing ows and 2 actuation ows. A sensing ow delivers sensing data from a sensor node to
the controller, while an actuation ow delivers control commands to an actuator. We only use two pairs of sensing
and actuation ows for two control loop. e extra sensing ows are reserved for redundant measurements, as it is
commonly designed in industrial scenarios. e maximum distance from a sensor to an actuator is 4 hops.
Since WirelessHART employs the Time Sloed Channel Hopping technology (TSCH) MAC, the superframe length
of this WSAN is 140ms, i.e. xed 14 time slots. e WSAN sensing delay (TS ) and actuation delay (TA) are set to 60 ms
and 80 ms, respectively. e worst-case execution times of the controller and the state observer are 30 ms and 0.2 ms
among 10000 operations, respectively. Hence, we set the computation delay of controller (TC ) to 30 ms, and Kalman
Filter delay (TKF ) to 10 ms, because the granularity of our simulation is 10ms. erefore, we set the frequencies of the
WSAN, the MPC controller, and the KF state observer in our simulations to 5Hz. And the frequencies of the plants are
set to 100Hz. Note that the control command executed at time Tk is based on the sensor measurements at Tk−1, as is
shown in Fig. 5. Since we are using MPC, at timeTk , we use {u
∗
j,k
}k−1
j=k−N
. In this way, we mitigate the delay of all the
modules and the eects of the actuation packet loss in the wireless control loop.
Because of the asymmetric nature of sensing and actuation sides [19], we adopt an asymmetric scheduling strategy.
For sensing ows, we do not provide any packet retransmission since the state observer mitigates the impact of packet
loss, as explained in Section. 3. For actuation ows, we set the maximum #TX to ηmax = 4 (As explained in Section. 3.2,
there is a diminishing return of PDR improvements as #TX increases. erefore, we set ηmax = 4 to eciently improve
PDR at reasonable cost.), and the minimum packet delivery ratio to ρmin = 0.7.
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Fig. 6. Holistic controller simulation under wireless interference. The wireless background noise is higher for the first 70 s, resulting
in a #TX adaptation.
6.2 Simulation Under Wireless Interference
We consider a disturbance on the wireless network caused by an increase in background noise on all channels, which
is common when the wireless sensor network is under wide-band continuous jamming aack. In this case, channel
hopping and channel blacklisting functionality of WirelessHART standard might fail to resist such aack. Our simula-
tion considers an increased value for the background noise for the rst 70 s at −75 dBm, and a reduction to a standard
value for the rest of the simulation at −78dbm, as shown in Fig. 6c. Note that the physical plant is unstable and in a
transient state for the rst 70 s; hence a low actuation packet delivery ratio should likely lead to diverging trajectories.
In this simulation (Fig. 6), there are two interesting observations. First, the #TX is increased twice, rst at t = 0 s,
and then at t ≈ 33.2 s. e rst increase is due to a violation of the safety bound condition in Lemma 4.5, while the
second is due to a violation of the worst-case Lyapunov evolution in Lemma 4.6. By time t ≈ 80 s, the physical plant
is well below the safety bound, implying that Alg. 1 successfully adapted to the higher wireless background noise.
Second, once the background noise is reduced, our algorithm slowly decreases the #TX , and nally stabilizing at a
point where the physical plant is stable even under a signicant number of actuation packet drops. Note that once the
physical plant reaches a steady state, the optimal input sent through the network is almost constant, with u∗t, j ≈ u¯ for
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Fig. 7. Zoom in of the simulation in Fig. 6 for the time interval [0, 40] s.
each j. In this case, the actuation buer, explained in Section. 3 and Fig. 2, almost completely mitigates the information
lost in the wireless network due to lower #TX .
Fig 7 is a zoom-in view of the rst 40 seconds of the simulation in Fig. 6. Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b validate our result in
Lemma 4.5 of using the Lyapunov function as a simple and practical test for safety. Also, the top green dashed line in
Fig. 7a is the bound induced by the worst-case evolution of the Lyapunov function, as explained in Lemma 4.6, which
results in an increase in the #TX when violated.
We compare cyber and physical properties of wireless control system when using dierent algorithms to adapt the
network conguration. We compare our algorithm, HC (Alg. 1), against: (1) an adaptation algorithm based only on
two PDR thresholds, namly, #TX increase threshold (80%) and #TX decrease threshold (90%). We regard this algorithm
as pure network solution, denoted PN; (2) constant #TX , denoted 2, 3, and 4. If an actuation packet adopts 1 TX, the
average packet delivery ratio is around 23% under noise level of −75 dbm, and around 53% even under a noise level of
−78 dbm, which will damage system performances. us, we set at least 1 retransmission to actuation packets. Each
algorithm is simulated 40 times, and unstable executions are discarded to avoid distorting the average computations. It
is worth noting that xed 2TX s results in 10 unstable simulations, and both PN and xed 3, 4TX s result in 1 unstable
simulation, while HC stabilizes all the executions.
Fig. 8 compares (a) the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of the physical states, (b) the number of scheduled transmissions
(#TX for short in the rest of the paper), (c) the average number of actual transmissions per actuation packet (#Actual TX
for short in the rest of the paper), and (d) the system lifetime with various wireless network conguration methods.
In reality, #Actual TX is oen less than scheduled #TX . For one reason, if the sender gets the Acknowledgement from
the receiver at the rst try, it will not send an extra time since the packet has already been received. For another
reason, if the packet is lost in previous hops, the sender has no packet to send. e #Actual TX is one determinant of
baery life. We assume wireless motes use AA baeries, the capacity of which is 8640 J. We dene the system life time
as the baery life of the most consuming node in the network, and calculate baery life based on the method in [39].
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Fig. 8. (a) MAE, (b) average #TX , (c) average #Actual TX , and (d) baery life for dierent #TX adaptation algorithms under
wireless interference. The algorithms are our holistic controller (HC), pure network adaptation (PN), and constant transmission
number equal to 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
According to Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, while our HC algorithm has a comparableMAE to PN and 4TX s, its average scheduled
#TX is around 2. Fig. 9 shows the ratio for #Actual TX with various wireless network conguration methods. HC has
the highest ratio of 0 and 1 actualTX per packet, since the system performances are sometimes acceptable even though
PDR is not high enough. At the same time, HC can also adjust the #Actual TX to 4 to guarantee control performances
when needed. Fig. 8c and Fig. 8d shows that the #Actual TX and the system lifetime of our HC algorithm are also
similar to 2TX . Furthermore, HC extends the system lifetime for more than one month compared with PN.
Fig. 10 compares the relationship between MAE and the #Actual TX , as well as the system lifetimes for dierent
network conguration algorithms. HC’s data points concentrate in the boom le area of Fig. 10a, which indicates that
this algorithm acquires smallerMAEwith a fewer #Actual TX . e simultaneous increase of bothMAE and #Actual TX
can be explained by the intuition of HC that poorer system performances will cause an increase of #Actual TX ; on
the other hand, no extra transmissions will be adopted when the physical system is in a good condition. is trend
indicates that network resources are adapted well based on the status of the physical plant. e same facts are reected
in Fig. 10b.
Manuscript submied to TCPS, May, 4, 2017
18 Y. Ma et al.
0 1 2 3 40
20
40
60
80
100
#Actual TX
R
at
io
 fo
r #
Ac
tu
al
 T
X 
(%
)
 
 
HC
PN
2 TX
3 TX
4 TX
Fig. 9. Ratio for #Actual TX under wireless interference
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
#Actual TX
M
AE
(a) Relationship between MAE and #Actual TX
140 160 180 200 2200
0.5
1
1.5
2
System Lifetime (Days)
M
AE
 
 
2
3
4
PN
HC
(b) Relationship between MAE and baery life
Fig. 10. Relationship between MAE and #Actual TX as well as system lifetime for dierent #TX adaptation algorithms under
wireless interference. The algorithms are HC (red), PN (black) and fixed #TX (blue), respectively.
6.3 Simulation Under Sensor Disturbance
We now consider an external bias applied to the physical plant sensor, modeling either a malfunction or an adversarial
aack. at is, we consider a system where the output equation (1) becomes yt = C xt + ωt for ωt ∈ R. In this
simulation, we keep the wireless background noise constant at −76 dBm.
Fig. 11 shows the result of our simulation, where a disturbance is applied in the interval [70, 120] s, with ωt = 0.5.
Again, we focus our aention on two outcomes of this simulation. First, twice our algorithm lowers the #TX to 1,
while maintaining the stability of the physical plant. Note that the actuation packet delivery ratio in both situations
is well below standard acceptable values, yet the use of an actuation buer mitigates any signicant impact that the
information loss has in the physical plant. Second, the plant remains stable under the application and later release of
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Fig. 11. Statistics under physical disturbance
the physical disturbance, both times thanks to an increase in the #TX . is phenomenon validates our cyber-physical
approach, where a controller that is designed to mitigate imperfections in the communication channels, together with
a network manager that is aware of the performance of the physical plant, jointly result in an ecient and safe control
system.
Fig. 12 is analogous to Fig. 8, but it considers the physical disturbance described above. Under sensor disturbance,
xed 2TX s results in 1 unstable simulation among 40, whereas none of the other algorithms produce unstable simula-
tions. Yet, HC results in executions with MAE comparable to constantly having a #TX equal to 3, as shown in Fig. 12a,
while achieving an average #TX of 2.5, as shown in Fig. 12b. Fig. 13 shows the ratio for the #Actual TX . HC also
obtains the highest ratio of 0 and 1 actual TX per packet, since the system performances sometimes are acceptable
even though the PDR is not high enough. Occasionally, HC increases the #Actual TX to 3 and 4 in an eort to handle
physical aacks. According to Fig. 12c and Fig. 12d, the #Actual TX of actuation WSAN nodes and the system lifetime
of the WSAN are almost equal with the baseline of xed 2 TX s. Compared to PN, HC is signicantly more ecient,
validating our principle of choosing the network conguration based on the performance of the physical plant.
Fig. 14 also presents similar results with Fig. 10 in which the data points of HC concentrate in the boom le area
of Fig. 14a and the boom right area of Fig. 14b. erefore, HC allows a WSAN to be more resilient to both cyber and
physical aack by adjusting its network conguration when needed. It also extends the system lifetime while keeping
MAE within reasonable values.
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Fig. 12. (a) MAE, (b) average #TX , (c) average #Actual TX , and (d) baery life for dierent #TX adaptation algorithms under a
sensor bias disturbance. The algorithms are our holistic controller (HC), pure network adaptation (PN), and constant transmission
number equal to 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
6.4 Multi-loop Control System
In this section, we include an open-loop stable plant that shares the WSAN with the plant described in Section. 6.1 to
form amulti-loop simulation. For this plant, the set of eigenvalues of A is equal to {0.4, 0.6, 0.96+0.02i,0.96−0.02i, 0.8}.
Since all eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, the plant is open-loop stable. e control loop of the plant described in
Section. 6.1 uses the same sensing and actuation ows as in previous sections. e added control loop of the open-loop
stable plant uses another pair of sensing and actuation ows in WSAN. Fig. 15 shows the simulation results of added
control loop under the same wireless interference as Section. 6.2.
As is shown in Fig. 15d, during the transient state, the #TX is adjusted to 2 for the rst 23 s. Since the plant is open-
loop stable, the Lyapunov function in Fig. 15b quickly decreases, and the #TX remains at 1 aer the transient state ends.
It is worth noting that, for open loop stable plants that stabilize at the equilibrium point, the system can retain perfect
performances even when the network drops most of its packets. As is shown in Fig. 16, open-loop stable system can
achieve smaller MAE with fewer #Actual TX , which indicates that our holistic management framework is eective
in allocating WSAN resources for the multi-loop system based on characteristics of physical plants . In this case, it
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Fig. 14. Relationship between MAE and #Actual TX as well as system lifetime for dierent #TX adaptation algorithms under
sensor bias disturbance. The algorithms are HC (red), PN (black) and fixed #TX (blue), respectively.
is possible to allocate those network resources to other lower priority applications such as network health reports.
However, the lower priority applications would have to be preempted if the actuation packets claim the network
resources. It is also possible to adopt other real-time scheduling and routing methods to balance the allocation of the
network resources to multiple control loops based on their properties such as open-loop stability, time constant and
run-time Lyapunov function. We will address those issues in our future work.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a holistic cyber-physical management framework to enhance the dependability of wire-
less control systems under both cyber and physical disturbances. e holistic management approach coordinate the
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Fig. 16. (a) MAE, (b) #Actual TX of open-loop unstable and open-loop stable plants, respectively, under a wireless interferences.
The #TX adaptation algorithm is HC.
physical control and network management mechanisms to safely control the physical plant while eciently allocating
wireless network resources. We then design a concrete holistic controller that considers the worst-case evolution of the
Lyapunov function of the plant under ideal network conditions, together with the run-time packet delivery ratio of the
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wireless network, and decides the number of transmissions for each wireless ow. We have implemented the holistic
controller and the network management mechanism in theWCPS simulator. A case study that systematically explores
both control and wireless performances has been presented using real-world wireless traces. Simulation results show
that our holistic controller is capable of maintain safe physical operation in the presence of sensor disturbances and
signicant wireless interference. ese results shed light on a new family of dependable cyber-physical systems that
provides dependable control while eciently allocating wireless network resources.
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